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• Eye movements to “nothing” can be used to observe exemplar retrieval from memory  
• We study whether memory biases in judgment can be explained by exemplar retrieval  
• We show that eye movements to “nothing” predict judgments 
• Eye movements mediate the effect of biasing cues on judgments  
• The study quantifies the biasing effect of memory on judgments 
  




When making judgments (e.g., about the quality of job candidates) decision makers should 
ignore salient, but unrepresentative information (e.g., the person’s name). However, research 
suggests that salient information influences judgments, possibly because memories of past 
encounters with similar information are integrated into the judgment. We studied eye 
movements to trace the link between the retrieval of past instances and their influence on 
judgments. Participants were more likely to look at screen locations where exemplars 
matching items on a name attribute had appeared, suggesting the retrieval of exemplars. Eye 
movements to exemplar locations predicted judgments, explaining why names influenced 
judgments. The results provide insights into how exemplars are integrated into the judgment 
process when assessing memory retrieval online. 
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When making judgments, people often rely on information retrieved from memory 
(Dougherty, Gettys, & Odgen, 1999; Hastie & Park, 1986). If salient, but irrelevant or 
unrepresentative information is retrieved, it can bias judgments. For instance, people evaluate 
others who resemble their significant others more positively (Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & 
Collins, 2008), possibly because memories of the similar, but for the judgment irrelevant, 
person were activated (see also Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991, Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & 
Brumby, 2010). A link between memory retrieval and judgments seems likely. However, so 
far it remained on a theoretical level, because it was not possible to directly observe what 
information was retrieved. The goal of this study is to provide this direct link between the 
retrieval of exemplars and judgment biases by making exemplar retrieval observable. 
Establishing this link is important because it allows measuring retrieval processes 
independently from judgments thereby quantifying the influence of memory on judgments.  
To this goal, we focused on a multiple-cue judgment task, in which a biasing effect of 
retrieved exemplars was postulated (von Helversen, Herzog & Rieskamp, 2014). In multiple-
cue judgments, people form a quantitative judgment by integrating information from several 
attributes (i.e., cues), for instance, evaluating the suitability of a job candidate based on 
several attributes.  In general, people rely on two cognitive processes when making multiple-
cue judgments: cue abstraction and exemplar memory (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2014; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Juslin, Karlsson & Olsson, 2008). Cue 
abstraction theories assume that people (1) abstract the relationship between cues and 
criterion, i.e., the relative importance of language skills for a specific job (2) make judgments 
by a linear additive integration of the weighted cues (e.g., Brehmer, 1994). 
In contrast, exemplar-based judgment processes assume that exemplars are stored as 
long-term memory representations that combine past instances with criterion values (e.g., 
Nosofsky, 1986). Similar exemplars are retrieved when a new instance is evaluated. Often, it 
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is assumed that people rely either on exemplar-based or cue abstraction processes, but 
exemplar similarity may influence judgments even when people are following rules. For 
instance, von Helversen and colleagues (2014) found that judgments of new candidates were 
biased toward the exemplar they resembled most—even though participants integrated 
attributes following a cue abstraction process. 
To test the link between exemplar retrieval and judgments, we studied eye movements 
using the so-called looking-at-nothing behavior (Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008; 
Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, & Hoover, 2009). That is, when retrieving information from 
memory (e.g., cue values of job candidates), people look back to associated but emptied 
spatial locations on a computer screen, a behavior that has been widely applied to study 
memory retrieval during judgment and decision-making (e.g., Jahn & Braatz, 2014; 
Martarelli, Chiquet, Laeng, & Mast, 2017; Pärnamets, Johansson, Gidlöf, & Wallin, 2015; 
Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Scholz, Krems, & Jahn, 2017; 
Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). For instance, in the study by Scholz et al. (2015), 
the more similar an exemplar was to a new job candidate, the longer participants gazed 
toward the empty spatial location associated with that exemplar, when using an exemplar-
based strategy. In comparison, when using cue abstraction, people did not look at exemplar 
locations, demonstrating that looking-at-nothing allows studying exemplar retrieval from 
memory. Here, we aim to go one step further and show that eye movements are directly 
linked to judgment(-biases) through the retrieval of exemplars. 
In the following, we test whether salient, but in this context usually irrelevant cues 
lead to similar biases in multi-attribute judgments from memory to those observed in previous 
studies (e.g., von Helversen et al., 2014). In this case, judgments for test items containing a 
match on this cue should systematically deviate from items with the same cue-criterion 
relationship but without a match on this cue. Second, we test whether eye movements reflect 
exemplar retrieval from memory. When judging test items, we expect longer fixation 
Running head: EXEMPLAR RETRIEVAL BIASES JUDGMENTS  
 
6
durations on more similar exemplars (see Scholz et al., 2015). Third, we test whether retrieval 
of exemplars can explain judgments, assuming that the longer people gaze toward the empty 
spaces where exemplars had been presented previously, the more their judgments should be 
influenced toward the criterion of the exemplar that occupied the space toward which they are 
looking. 
2. Method 
Participants’ task was to judge the suitability of job candidates applying for an open 
position in a fictional company. Therefore, they first learned information about previous job 
candidates (training exemplars) who had applied for a similar position and their ratings 
(criterions). During test trials, new test candidates had to be judged according to their 
suitability. Test candidates differed in their similarity in cue values to the exemplars and in 
their names1. 
2.1  Participants 
Fifty students (43 female, 7 male, Mage = 22.83 years, range 18–28 years) at the 
University of Zurich participated in the experiment for course credit or financial 
compensation [15 Swiss francs (CHF) per hour]. In addition, they could earn a bonus 
depending on their performance (M = 8.31 CHF). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Mean track accuracy was, at M = 0.63° of visual angle, very high. All 
participants signed informed consent forms. 
We chose a sample size of 50 to have appropriate power to find an effect of medium 
size for similarity on eye movements (hp2 =. 06 requires N= 48 to reach a power of 95%, see 
Faul, Erdfelder, & Buchner, 2007). 
2.2  Apparatus and Materials 
                                               
1 All experimental materials and data are available at https://osf.io/g9fqz/ Details on subjects’ performance 
during the task, methods, and statistical analyses can be found in the supplemental materials. 
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Participants were seated in front of a 22-inch computer screen (1,680 × 1,050 pixels) 
at a distance of 700 mm and instructed to position their head in a chin rest. The eye tracker 
system SMI iView RED sampled data from the right eye at 500Hz and recorded with iView X 
2.8 following a five-point calibration. Fixation detection was done with IDF Event detector 9 
(SMI, Teltow) using a peak velocity threshold of 30°/s and a minimum fixation duration of 80 
ms. We analyzed data with mixed models (using R, R Core Team, 2017, and packages: lme4, 
Bates et al., 2017; afex, Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 2018; emmeans, Lenth, 2018).  
Study materials consisted of four training exemplars and 36 additional test items, see 
Table S1 in the supplemental materials. All items contained information on three cues: work 
experience, language skills, and professional training. Cue values ranged from very poor, 
poor, average, good, to very good. Item names were popular male names in the German-
speaking region of Switzerland between 1980 and 2015 (www.bfs.admin.ch). Criterion values 
followed a linear function of the three cues assuming an equal weighting of the cues. Names 
were not necessary for accurately judging the suitability. The judgment scale ranged from 0 
(very poor) to 60 (very good). Two exemplars had a low criterion (15) and two a high 
criterion (45). A small error was introduced to the exemplar criterion values of plus/minus 
two points and balanced between participants. Items could either have the same name as a 
low- or high-performing exemplar (-Name: 9 items, +Name: 9 items) or they could have a 
different name (No-Match: 22 items). Test items varied in their similarity to the exemplars, 
ranging from zero to three matches in cue values with one exemplar (0: 6, 1: 16, 2: 10, and 3: 
8 items).  
2.3  Procedure 
2.3.1 Exemplar learning. Participants learned cue information about the four 
exemplars presented in rectangles on the screen (see Figure 1A). During learning trials, only 
the emptied rectangles were visible and a name or cue value was presented auditorily. 
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Participants had to indicate the rectangle to which the name or cue value belonged and 
received visual and auditory feedback for their response. Learning continued until participants 
remembered all names and cue information (4 names + 12 cue values = 16 pieces of 
information) correctly in two consecutive blocks or after 20 blocks. One block consisted of a 
test of all four exemplars, that is, 16 trials. 
 
Figure 1. A) Learning materials consisting of information about four training candidates (two 
high- and two low-performing exemplars). Each exemplar was presented in one of the four 
screen quadrants. The distance from the center of the screen to the center of each of the four 
exemplars was 7.04° of visual angle (414 pixels). Names and cue values were presented as 
black text in rectangles with black borders and a light grey background. Each rectangle had a 
size of 2.55° × 1.28° of visual angle (150 × 75 pixels). The center of each of the four 
rectangles containing the information describing one exemplar had a distance of 2.72° of 
visual angle (160 pixels) from the center of each quadrant. Visual materials were presented in 
four balanced orders, varying the positions of the exemplars on the screen and the order of cue 
values between participants. Note that the size of the rectangles containing cue information in 
the Figure was increased to increase readability and the cue information translated into 
English. B) Experimental procedure during test trials. Auditory stimuli consisted of names, 
cue dimensions, and cue values. Items were always presented with the names first, followed 
by the cue values from left to right as visually presented on the screen during exemplar 
A B
Daniel: 
work experience: poor 
language skills: average
professional training: good
0    5  10  15 20 25  30  35  40 45  50 55  60
Points



































Running head: EXEMPLAR RETRIEVAL BIASES JUDGMENTS  
 
9
learning, thereby varying the presentation order between participants. For the gaze analyses, 
we drew four rectangular areas of interest (AOIs) around each of the four exemplar locations. 
Each exemplar AOI had a size of 8.93° × 6.38° of visual angle (525 × 375 pixels). The size of 
the exemplar AOI exceeded the outer borders of each of the four rectangles describing one 
exemplar by 0.64° of visual angle, that is, half the height of one rectangle. 
 
2.3.2 Criterion learning. Participants learned how each exemplar had been evaluated 
in the past. In each trial, participants were auditorily presented with the name and cue values 
of one of the four exemplars while looking at the empty rectangles (see Figure 1B) and could 
think about their judgments. Once they decided on a judgment they proceeded to a separate 
screen where they entered their judgment on a rating scale and received visual and auditory 
feedback on the correctness of their judgments. We limited the time to enter the ratings to 
eight seconds, to ensure that participants would only proceed when they had determined their 
judgment. This was to avoid that decision-making continued while participants were looking 
at the rating scale, and thus to capture as much of the judgment process in participants’ 
looking-at-nothing behavior as possible. Criterion learning ended after participants correctly 
judged all four exemplars in two consecutive blocks or after ten blocks. One block consisted 
of a test of the four exemplar criterion values, that is, four trials.  
2.3.3 Test phase. The test phase followed the same procedure as the criterion learning 
phase, but without feedback. Overall, participants judged the 40 test items (four exemplars 
and 36 test items) twice in a random sequence in two blocks, resulting in 80 trials per person.  
3. Results 
Before testing whether exemplar retrieval can be directly linked to judgment biases, 
we assessed two presumptions: (1) the names manipulation influences judgments, (2) 
participants gaze longer at more similar exemplars, indicating exemplar retrieval. 
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3.1  Preparatory data analyses 
For all participants and test trials, 190 trials were removed (4.8 % of all trials): In 22 
trials (0.6 % of trials), no gaze data was recorded (e.g., due to eyes closed, looking off the 
screen), and in 168 trials (4.2 % of all trials), no rating was recorded because participants took 
longer than eight seconds to provide their judgment.  
3.2  Names bias judgments 
Names biased judgments similarly to faces (see von Helversen et al., 2014). Linear 
mixed model analyses2 revealed a significant main effect for the factor name (-Name, No-
Match, +Name): F(2,115.3) = 5.80, p = .004. Judgments were the lowest for items with the 
same name as low-performing exemplars (EMM–Name = 27.81) and highest for items with the 
name of high-performing exemplars (EMM+Name = 28.84). Judgments for items with a 
different name lay in the middle (EMMNo-Match = 28.66). Pairwise comparisons revealed 
significant differences between the -Name and No-Match (p = .001) and between the -Name 
and +Name conditions (p = .008), but not between the No-Match and +Name conditions 
(p = .47). Judgments were also significantly predicted by the cue values of the three cues (all 
ps < .001). 
3.3  Eye movements reflect exemplar retrieval 
Fixation proportions per trial were calculated based on the number of fixations on four 
exemplar AOIs (see Figure 1). For each test item, we determined fixations on the most similar 
exemplar, defined as the exemplar with the highest number of matching cues (the relevant 
exemplar). If two exemplars were equally similar to the test item, fixation proportions for one 
of them was chosen randomly3. Similarity varied between 0 and 3 matches. 
                                               
2 Details on the fixed and random effects structure, the parameter fitting procedure and calculation of 
degrees of freedom for this and all following analyses are described in the supplemental materials. 
3 This was the case for six items sharing one cue value with two exemplars. See Table S1 in the supplemental 
materials, see also https://osf.io/g9fqz/ 
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If test items matched the name of an exemplar, fixation proportions were increased, 
main effect name: c2(2) = 80.09, p < .001 (Figure 2). Additionally, the more a test item 
resembled the relevant exemplar, the higher fixation proportions toward the relevant 
exemplar, main effect similarity: c2(3) = 15.38, p < .002, replicating the results of Scholz et 
al. (2015). The factors name and similarity interacted, c2(6) = 170.25, p < .001, with a 
significant linear increase of fixation proportions as a function of similarity only in the No-
Match condition, Estimate = 2.74, SE = 0.47, z = 5.80, p < .001. There was no difference 
between the –Name and +Name conditions, Estimate = -0.19, SE = 0.18, z = -1.06, p = 0.29. 
These results show that (1) when the name matched an exemplar, fixation proportions toward 
that exemplar were relatively high over all levels of similarity, and (2) it did not matter if the 
name matched a high- or low-performing training candidate. 
 
Figure 2. Two-way interaction of similarity × name match on fixation proportions toward the 
relevant exemplar (exemplar with maximal no. of shared cues). The black lines show 
predictions based on fixed effects. Gray lines in the background show predictions of the 
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3.4  Exemplar retrieval predicts judgments 
Fixation proportions to high-performing exemplars (summed fixation durations for the 
two locations associated with high-performing exemplars divided by the summed fixation 
durations to all locations) significantly predicted judgments, main effect fixation proportions: 
F(1,66.6) = 18.43, p < .001. The longer participants looked at the empty rectangles containing 
the cue information of the high-performing exemplars, the higher their judgments (Figure 3). 
Like in the first analysis, names as well as cue values determined participant’s judgments, 
Name: F(2,182.7) = 3.99, p = .02, Cues: all ps < .001. There was no interaction between name 
and fixation proportions: F(2,1791.1) = 2.54, p = .08, indicating that there was no significant 
difference in fixation proportions to high-performing exemplars and judgments between the 
name conditions. 
 
Figure 3. Relation of fixation proportions to the two high-performing 
exemplars and judgments in the three name conditions. The black lines show predictions 
based on fixed effects. Gray lines in the background show predictions of the individual 
random effects from all participants. 
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Lastly, we tested if the effect of name on judgments can be explained by the retrieval 
of exemplars from memory with a mediation analysis for multilevel data (Imai, Keele, and 
Tingley, 2010; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014). We estimated the 
mediation effect for the contrast between low- and high-performing names. The effect of 
name on judgments could be accounted for by fixation proportions (see Figure 4) with a high 
overall proportion of 0.58 mediated, p = .002.  
 
Figure 4. Mediation model with one mediating variable. Displayed is the total effect of name 
on judgments (c), the direct effect of name on judgments in the model also allowing for 
mediation by fixation proportions (c’), and the indirect effect of name on judgments via 
fixation proportions (a × b). Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
 
4. Discussion 
Many studies assume a link between memory retrieval and judgments, but often 
without providing independent measures of the retrieval process. The purpose of this study 
was to provide direct evidence for the relation between the retrieval of exemplars and 
judgments. To test this, we studied eye movements to observe retrieval processes during 
multi-attribute judgments.  
When participants judged the suitability of job candidates based on cue information 




a × b = 0.62 
p = .002
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salient attribute like the name of the candidate, increased fixations to the name matching 
exemplar. Previous research proposed that eye fixations to associated, but emptied spatial 
locations indicate memory retrieval (e.g., Richardson & Spivey, 2000), and when applied to 
multi-attribute decision-making, they can reflect exemplar retrieval (Scholz et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, the results of this study suggest that the name increased the probability that an 
exemplar with the same name was retrieved and this biased judgments in the direction of the 
retrieved exemplar. This interpretation is in line with the result that participants rated 
candidates worse than similarly qualified candidates when they had the same name as a low-
performing previous candidate. Although, judgments were increased for items sharing a name 
with a high-performing exemplar in comparison to items with a new name, this difference was 
not significant — possibly because participants tended to give relatively low ratings. Mean 
ratings in all name conditions were below 30, the midpoint of the judgments scale. 
Importantly, we could establish a direct link between exemplar retrieval measured 
through eye movements and judgments. The more participants gazed back toward high-
performing exemplars, the higher their suitability ratings. Furthermore, a mediation analysis 
showed that fixation proportions accounted for the effect of names on judgments. One 
interpretation is that the differences in likelihood with which exemplars were retrieved led to 
the effect of names on judgments. 
The results provide first direct evidence for a tight interplay between retrieval 
processes and judgment biases when salient, but potentially irrelevant information is 
retrieved. There are two limitations to the interpretation of these results. First, some 
participants may have used the candidate’s name as a deliberative cue, even though in a job 
context names are unlikely to be relevant for judging suitability and considering them was not 
necessary to make accurate judgments. Still, during the criterion learning phase participants 
could perform accurately by only considering the name. Thus, we cannot rule out that 
participants deliberatively used the name in the test phase. Second, this study does not allow 
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to draw a causal conclusion between memory retrieval and judgment bias. For instance, a 
tendency to give a high judgment could lead participants to retrieve a high performing 
exemplar. Nevertheless, our findings demonstrate the importance of memory for 
understanding judgment processes in general (Dougherty et al., 1999) and particularly the 
influence of exemplars (Juslin et al., 2008) in producing the observed biases.  
Not only names, but also cue values of test candidates determined judgments. This 
suggests that participants did not just use criterion values of retrieved exemplars, but 
integrated them with a cue-based judgment process. Furthermore, eye movements were also 
related to judgments when names were new and thus did not influence exemplar retrieval. In 
these cases, retrieval was a function of similarity between the test item and the exemplars 
suggesting that exemplar retrieval is an inherent part of the judgment processes.  
In this study, cue information about exemplars was learned by heart. This could lead to 
an increased influence of exemplars on judgments, because exemplars were highly available 
in memory. Although, in the study by Scholz et al. (2015), in which exemplar information 
was learned by heart, people used other strategies (e.g., cue abstraction), future research 
should test, if the same judgment and gaze behavior can be observed, when participants are 
only trained on the learning criterion and not explicitly trained on cue values of exemplars. 
This would also make the task more similar to standard multiple-cue tasks. 
Besides its merits, memory can be a source of bias during judgments when the 
information that is activated should be irrelevant for the judgment at hand. We showed how 
this effect of memory could be directly observed by studying looking-at-nothing behavior.  
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